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Abstract
Emerging economies tend to experience larger political uncertainty and more default
episodes than developed countries. This paper studies the eﬀect of political uncertainty on
sovereign default and interest rate spreads in emerging markets. The paper develops a quan-
titative model of sovereign debt and default under political uncertainty in a small open
economy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quantitative analysis shows that higher
levels of political uncertainty signiﬁcantly raise the default frequency and both the level and
volatility of the spreads. When parties borrow from international credit markets, the pres-
ence of political uncertainty induces a short-sight behavior in politicians.
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de default soberano que las econom´ ıas desarrolladas. Este art´ ıculo estudia el efecto del riesgo
pol´ ıtico sobre el default soberano y las tasas de inter´ es en econom´ ıas emergentes. Se desarrolla
un modelo cuantitativo de deuda soberana y default con incertidumbre pol´ ıtica para una
econom´ ıa peque˜ na y abierta. Consistente con los datos, el an´ alisis cuantitativo muestra que
mayores niveles de riesgo pol´ ıtico aumentan la tasa de default as´ ı como el nivel y volatilidad
de los spreads. Al pedir prestado en el exterior, la inclusi´ on de incertidumbre pol´ ıtica genera
una visi´ on corta por parte de los gobiernos.
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Emerging markets usually face larger political uncertainty, and are more crisis prone
than developed economies. In the last two decades, small developing economies have
experienced several episodes of sovereign default and high political uncertainty, some of
the most recent being Ecuador in 1999 and Argentina in 2001 among others. Indeed,
empirical studies by Citron and Nickelsburg (1987), Balkan (1992), Li (1992), Rivoli and
Brewer (1997) and Peter (2002) ﬁnd evidence of the importance of political factors in
studying sovereign debt and default issues. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between
the probability of default and the level of political instability, thus pointing out political
risk as an important component of a country’s credit worthiness. This paper models this
feature and provides a quantitative assessment of the impact of political uncertainty on
default incentives, on sovereign debt and thus on the behavior of country interest rate
spreads.
Fragile and often unstable political institutions have been the norm in Latin Amer-
ica. Most Latin American countries have weaker public institutions than those found
in the investmente-grade countries of Europe and Asia, a factor that contributes to
their more volatile economic performance. Signiﬁcant increases in short term interest
rate volatility from political risk has been evidenced in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and
Venezuela in 2005. In fact, one of the biggest threats to economic stability has come
from the political uncertainty derived from the general discontent in many countries
with politicians and with the way political institutions function1. These features sug-
1In 1997, less than two years before the Ecuador’s default, president Abdala Bucaram was over-
thrown. Between 2001 and 2002 two presidents were forced to resign in Argentina, Fernando De la Rua
and Adolfo Rodriguez Saa. In the last two years two presidents were overthrown in Bolivia, Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 and Carlos Mesa in 2005.gests that political uncertainty may have a signiﬁcant role on business cycle ﬂuctuations,
foreign debt sustainability and the level and volatility of country interest rate spreads
in developing countries.
The objective of this paper is to study the eﬀects of political uncertainty on incen-
tives to default and equilibrium interest rates in developing countries using a dynamic
stochastic model of a small open economy with endogenous default and political risk.
The quantitative model is based on the willingness to pay approach developed by Eaton
and Gerzovitz (1981). Arellano and Mendoza (2002) discuss how this approach can be
used to explain emerging market features. The model captures some of the main em-
pirical regularities present in these markets: default occurs in equilibrium, the current
account, default risk and interest rate spreads are countercyclical,and the default rate,
the interest rate spreads and their volatility increase signiﬁcantly as the level of political
uncertainty raises.
There are two types of households in the economy, each represented by a political
party that has a given probability of being reelected next period if it is in oﬃce today.
The benevolent and rational current incumbent party, i.e., the government in the econ-
omy, has access to international ﬁnancial markets where it can borrow or lend to foreign
lenders. Markets are incomplete because the government buys and sells one period non
contingent discount bond and it cannot commit to repay its sovereign debt.
The model provides insight on how do changes in the reelection probabilities of these
parties impact on the countries’ risk of default, and thus, aﬀect spreads. It is observed
that a lower probability of the incumbent to remain in oﬃce may lead to higher country
interest rate spreads. When parties borrow from international credit markets, they
know that there is a positive probability of being out of power next period. In that casethey would not be asked to pay the country’s foreign debt. Therefore, they are willing
to borrow more at higher interest rates. This short-sight behavior due to political risk
is also present in Amador (2003) where political uncertainty reduces the ability of a
country to save and in Azzimonti (2004) where under-investment in infrastructure and
overspending in public goods results from the presence of political risk.
The paper is related to Arellano (2004) who develops a quantitative model based
on the willingness to pay approach in order to study output, real exchange rates and
country spreads in emerging markets. Her analysis, however, does not address the issue
of political uncertainty. Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) analyze the eﬀect of stochastic
productivity trends to improve the empirical predictions of the model without including
political risk. Yue (2004) analyzes the quantitative eﬀects of sovereign debt renegotiation
on country interest rate spreads but again she does not consider any political factor in
her study.
The paper proceeds as follows: the economic environment and the theoretical model
are presented in section 2, the equilibrium is deﬁned in section 3, the quantitative
implications of the model are analyzed in sections 4 and 5 and the conclusions are
presented in section 6. The algorithm is described in the appendix.
2. The Model
Consider a neoclassical small open economy model with two types of domestic agents,
each represented by a political party, and foreign lenders. Each period one of the two
p a r t i e si si no ﬃce and the incumbent remains in power with a given probability π.T h e
only asset traded in international ﬁnancial markets is a one period non contingent real
discount bond that is available to the party in oﬃce, that is, to the government. Debtcontracts are not enforceable as the party in oﬃce has the option to default on them.
When it defaults, the country is temporarily cut oﬀ from credit markets. Foreign lenders
charge a premium to account for the probability of not being paid back.
Each period the country receives an endowment of goods y. The endowment is as-
sumed to follow a Markov process. Let Q(yt+1|yt) denote the Markov transition function.
The ruling party decides on the allocation of the endowment between households and on
the purchase of foreign bonds. However, it lacks commitment to repay its sovereign debt.
This feature, together with the political uncertainty included in this otherwise standard
neoclassical framework, are intended to capture some relevant empirical regularities and
take into account commonly observed features of emerging economies.
The representative agent of type i, where i =1 , 2, derives utility from the con-
sumption of a tradable good and has preferences given by the present value of the
sum of instantaneous utility functions. The period utility function is concave, strictly





where σ ∈ (0,1), so u(0) = 0.
2.1. The Government
Political party 1 represents agent 1 and faces the following decisions: when in oﬃce
it must initially decide whether to default or not on the country’s foreign debt, and
if it does not default it decides on the allocation of the endowment that the country
receives, on the consumption allocation for each agent and on the foreign debt for next
period. If it defaults it only decides on the allocation of the endowment between the two
agents. If not in oﬃce, the party receives the resource allocations that the other partyin government optimally chooses. The parties face intertemporal problems which are
expressed in a recursive dynamic programming form where the state variables for the
incumbent are B, y and d, such that d =1if the economy has access to credit markets
and 0 otherwise. The value function of the incumbent, party 1, who has access to credit
markets and begins the period with an amount of foreign assets B and endowment y is
denoted by V0(B,y). The party must decide whether to default or not by comparing
the value of paying back and remaining in the credit market V c(B,y),w i t ht h ev a l u e
of defaulting and living in temporary autarky V d(y).
Therefore, the initial default decision for party 1 when in oﬃce and the economy is
participating in ﬁnancial markets can be written as follows
V0(B,y)=m a x {V c(B,y),Vd(y)} (2.1)
The party can choose between paying the current country’s debt or defaulting on it.
This decision results from comparing the net beneﬁts of the two alternatives, that is, by
optimally balancing the cost of exclusion given by the foregone beneﬁts of consumption
smoothing against the direct costs of repayment given by the short-run disutility of





1 if V d(y) >Vc(B,y)
0 otherwise
which indicates that party 1 optimally defaults whenever the discounted value of choos-
ing to default is equal or higher than the continuation value. The default policies
determine a repayment set Γ(B) deﬁned as the set of values of the exogenous shocks
such that repayment is optimal given asset holding level B,
Γ(B)={y ∈ Υ : D(B,y)=1 }and a default set z(B) deﬁned as the set of values of the exogenous shocks such that
default is optimal given asset holding level B,
z(B)={y ∈ Υ : D(B,y)=0 }
When party 1 decides to pay, it can issue new debt and faces the following budget
constraint:
C1 + C2 = y + B − q(B0,y)B0
where Ci denotes the consumption allocation for agent i made by party 1 in oﬃce.
A negative value of B implies that the country has foreign debt, q(B0,y) is the price
of the bond that pays one unit of goods next period if the next government does not
default. When party 1 borrows, it sells bonds in the international credit market, and
when it lends, it buys bonds from foreign creditors. A sell of B0 in bonds - a negative
value of B0- implies that the party receives q(B0,y)B0 units of the good from foreign
creditors on the current period and promises that next period’s ruling party will pay B0
units conditional on not defaulting. In the same way, a purchase of bonds of value B0
implies that the party lends q(B0,y)B0 units of the good to foreign creditors and next
period’s ruling party will receive B0 units the following period. It is assumed that foreign
creditors always pay their debts, so the only agent who may decide not to commit to
repay is the domestic ruling party. When the incumbent borrows, the price of the bond
reﬂects the possibility that the next period’s ruling party defaults, so this price should
depend on B0 (the amount that is borrowed) and on y (since today’s endowment shocks
aﬀect the probability distribution for next period endowments) because the incentives
to default depend on both factors.
Therefore, the government’s problem when it participates in international creditmarkets can be expressed as follows:




















C1 + C2 = y + B − q(B0,y)B0
V 0 is the discounted continuation value for party 1 when party 2 is in oﬃce and the
country has access to international credit markets, so that party 2 has the option to









i denotes the consumption allocation for agent i made by party 2 in oﬃce, and














which means that party 2 did not default and therefore is choosing foreign assets for
next period B∗0 as well as consumption allocations C∗
1,C∗
2.
When party 2 defaults, the expression for V 0 c a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s
V 0(B,y)=V
d(B,y) (2.5)
if D∗(B,y)=1When the party in oﬃce, party 1 in this case, decides not to pay the outstanding
foreign debt, the country loses access to international credit markets for a stochastic
number of periods, so the economy is temporarily in ﬁnancial autarky without being
able to save or borrow. Therefore, the problem for party 1 when the country is in
a u t a r k yi sa sf o l l o w s :
































(1 − γ)y = Cd
1 + Cd
2
which shows that the country has no instruments now to smooth household consump-
tion and it loses a fraction γ of output while in autarky. µ denotes the probability of
reentering ﬁnancial markets next period. When the economy returns to ﬁnancial mar-
kets, it does so with no debt burden, B =0 . The expression for the utility of party 1




























i denotes the consumption allocation for agent 1 made by party 2 in oﬃce
when the country is in autarky.
The problem for party 2 is analogous to the one for party 1 and the following notation
is used:
J0(B,y) is the value function of party 2 when it is in oﬃce, it has access to credit
markets and it begins the period with an amount of foreign assets B and endowment y.
Jc(B,y) represents the utility from repaying debt for party 2 when it is in oﬃce.
Jd(y) represents the utility of not repaying for party 2 (it is in oﬃce).J0(B,y) represents the utility for party 2 when party 1 is in oﬃce, the country has
access to international credit markets and party 1 has the option to default.
J
c(B,y) represents the utility for party 2 when party 1 is in oﬃce and decided to
pay the debt.
J
d(y) is the utility for party 2 when party 1 is in oﬃce and decided to default.
C∗
1, C∗
2,B ∗0 are the optimal consumption and saving choices made by party 2 when
the country is in ﬁnancial markets, D∗(B,y) is the optimal default decision and C∗d
1 , C∗d
2
are the optimal consumption choices made by party 2 when the country is in autarky.
2.2. Foreign Creditors
T h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e ro fi d e n t i c a l ,i n ﬁnitely lived foreign lenders. Each lender can
borrow or lend resources at the risk free rate rf and lends in a perfectly competitive
market to the small open economy. The individual lender is risk neutral. As pointed
out by Cole and Kehoe (1996), the assumption of risk neutrality of lenders captures the
idea that the domestic economy is small compared to world credit markets.
Creditors have perfect information regarding the economy’s endowment and political
processes and each period they can observe the endowment level, as well the ruling party.
They choose loans B0 to maximize expected proﬁts taking into account the probability
of each of the parties being in oﬃce tomorrow. Then, when party 1 is in oﬃce, lenders
maximize the following expression:




(1 − π)(1 − λ∗(B0,y))
1+rf
B0
and if party 2 is in oﬃce, lenders maximize




(1 − π)(1 − λ(B∗0,y))
1+rf
B∗0where q is the price of a one-period non contingent bond if party 1 is the incumbent
and q∗is the price if party 2 is the incumbent, B0 is the amount of assets issued by
the government if party 1 is in oﬃce and B∗0 is the corresponding amount if party 2
is in oﬃce. λ and λ∗ are the endogenous default probabilities for party 1 and party 2
respectively. π is the probability of staying in oﬃce for any incumbent. Note that only
the incumbent borrows from capital markets.
Perfect competition in the credit market implies that the zero expected proﬁtc o n -
dition for the foreign creditor must be satisﬁed. The correspondent bond prices if party
















The paper focuses on Markov Perfect Equilibria, i.e. subgame perfect equilibria that use
Markov strategies. It is assumed that parties play only stationary Markov strategies:
their decisions are only a function of the payoﬀ relevant (state) variables at a given
point in time. There is no reputation building under this assumption, so that whatever
occurred in the past does not aﬀect the current income and the future does not matter
for the politicians’ behavior.




i (y) for i =1 , 2, default functions D(B,y),D∗(B,y)
and asset functions G(B,y),G ∗(B,y) such that X = {D(B,y),G(B,y),C i(B,y),Cd
i (y)}
for party 1 and X∗ = {D∗(B,y),G ∗(B,y),C∗
i (B,y),C∗d
i (y)} for party 2Thus, the consumption correspondence Ci(B,y) i =1 ,2 determines the consumption
allocation to all parties that party 1 will choose if she is in power at some time with an
asset level B, endowment level y and the country having access to credit markets. A
consumption allocation C2(B,y) is the consumption party 1 will provide to party 2 if she
w e r ei np o w e rw i t ha na s s e tl e v e lB, endowment level y and the country participating
in ﬁnancial markets. The function G(B,y) reﬂects the savings in the foreign asset if
party 1 is in power with assets B and endowment y.
Proposition 1 If parties play Markov strategies and party i does not value the
consumption of agent j then Cj =0 and Cd
j =0
If parties play Markov strategies and party 1 does not value the consumption of agent
2, when party 1 is in oﬃce it chooses C2 =0and Cd
2 =0 . In a Markov equilibrium the
consumption allocation decisions do not aﬀect the state for tomorrow, therefore party
1 sets the consumption allocations to maximize the per period utility of agent 1, this
implies giving all the resources to household 1. Analogously, since party 2 does not value
the consumption of agent 1, when party 2 is in oﬃce it chooses C∗
1 =0and C∗d
1 =0 .
Deﬁnition 3.2. A recursive equilibrium for this small open economy is characterized
by
i. a set of value functions V0,Vc,Vd,V 0,V
c,V




ii. a set of policies for consumption Ci(B,y),C d
i (y),i =1 ,2,C ∗
i (B,y),C ∗d
i (y) i =
1,2, default policies D(B,y),D ∗(B,y) and asset holdings G(B,y),G ∗(B,y) for parties
1 and 2 respectively,
iii. a set of default probability functions: λ(B0,y) for party 1 and λ∗(B0,y) for party
2 and a set of bond price functions: q(B0,y) for party 1 and q∗(B0,y) for party 2such that
1. Given the bond price function q(B0,y) and party 2’s strategies, party 1’s value
functions V0,Vc,Vd,V 0,V
c,V
d and default policy D(B,y) solve problem (2.1) and party
1’s policies for foreign asset holdings G(B,y) and for consumption Ci(B,y),i=1 ,2 solve
problem (2.2), Cd
i (y),i=1 ,2 solves problem (2.6) and analogously for party 2 for value
functions J0,Jc,Jd,J0,J
c,J
d and policies D∗(B,y),G ∗(B,y),C∗
i (B,y),C∗d
i (y),i=1 ,2,
given the bond price function q∗(B∗0,y) and party 1’s strategies.
2. Given λ(B0,y) and λ∗(B0,y) the bond price functions q(B0,s) and q∗(B0,s) are
such that all agents in the small open economy are optimizing and international lenders












(1 − π)(1 − λ(B∗0,y))
1+rf
B∗0
where B0 = G(B,y),B ∗0 = G∗(B,y)
The equilibrium implies that if party 2 follows X∗ then the best response of party 1
is X, and if party 1 follows X then the best response of party 2 is X∗.W ef o c u so na
symmetric equilibrium: both parties play the same strategies, so the problem faced by
the parties in this small open economy is the same. For any given state of the economy
(B,d,y) the party in oﬃce faces the same problem, no matter which party is.
Deﬁnition 3.3. A Symmetric Markov Equilibrium (SME) is a set of policies for con-
sumption, default and asset holdings (XS) for each party such that for any B,y,d
and any other feasible values X , V0(B,y/Xs,X s) ≥ V0(B,y/X,Xs) for party 1 and
J0(B,y/Xs,X s) ≥ J0(B,y/X,Xs) for party 2.In the SME the value generated by following Xs,X s is equal or larger than the one
generated by any other feasible allocation X while the given party is in power and when
the other party follows Xs.
In the symmetric equilibrium parties choose optimal consumption, the optimal de-
fault policy and optimal asset holding policy subject to the resource constraint and
foreign lenders optimizing by satisfying their zero proﬁt condition from the debt con-
tract. In those states where party 1 defaults, party 2 will also default: default sets and
repayment sets are equal for both parties. Thus, when parties do not default while in
oﬃce, they choose the same amount of foreign assets. Therefore, their asset decisions
are the same and for any given state (B,y) both parties make the same default decision
Ds(·) and asset holding decision Gs(·), so the unique default probability function is
denoted as λs(B0,y).




where B0 = Gs(B,y)
The symmetric equilibrium bond price qs(B0,y) reﬂects the probability of default of





so that the default probability is zero when zs(B0)=∅ and it is one when zs(B0)=Υ.4. Quantitative Analysis
The model is solved numerically and the parameters are based on existing data and
empirical work on emerging markets. Argentina is used as a benchmark because a
long time series on country interest rates is available. However, many of the business
cycles features observed in Argentina are shared by other emerging market economies,
Aguiar and Gopinath (2004a). The data are seasonally adjusted quarterly real series
obtained from the Ministry of Economy and Production (MECON) of Argentina. The
interest rates for Argentina are taken from Neumeyer and Perri (2004)2. Output and
consumption are in logs and the current account is presented as a percentage of GDP.
Spreads correspond to the diﬀerence between Argentina interest rates and US three
month treasury bond rate. All series are ﬁltered with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Table
1s h o w st h ed a t a .
Figures 1 and 2 in appendix illustrate the correlations between political risk, interest
rates spreads and GDP movements for Argentina, as ﬁgure 2 shows, there is a strong
negative correlation between interest rate spreads and political risk3. In addition, Figure
1 shows the counter-cyclicality of Argentinian interest rates spreads.
The calibration involved choosing the functional form of the utility function and the
values of the parameters. The utility function follows a CRRA where σ ∈ (0,1) so that
u(0) = 0 which allows for utility comparisons given that in any period one of the two
agents will consume a zero amount of the consumption good in equilibrium.
The discount factor β is set at 0.95. One weakness of previous quantitative models
2The serie for the interest rate for Argentina stars in 1983
3Political risk ratings are taken from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): Risk ratings range
from a high of 100 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk)of sovereign default without political risk is that they require a high level of impatience
to generate default in equilibrium, so low values of the discount factor are employed to
match the default rates. Arellano (2004), Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) and Yue (2004)
use values of 0.84, 0.80 and 0.74 respectively. The inclusion of political uncertainty
allows us to use a more standard value for the discount factor.
In order to analyze the eﬀects of political uncertainty on incentives to default and
sovereign interest rate spreads, diﬀerent probability values were considered for the re-
election probability, with 0.7 as the benchmark . Since quarterly data is considered
and elections take place every four or ﬁve years, we can interpret π as the likelihood
that the ruling party is overthrown by the other party. The value of 0.7 helps to match
the default rate in Argentina. According to Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003)
Argentina defaulted four times from 1824 to 1999. In addition, this country defaulted
one more time in 2002 which adds up to ﬁve defaults in the last 180 years.
The probability of reentering ﬁnancial markets after default µ is set to 0.1 which
is in line to the estimates of Gelos et al. (2003). They ﬁnd that during the default
episodes of the 1980’s and 1990’s countries were excluded from the capital markets on
average less than 3 years. The probability of redemption equal to 0.1 implies that a
defaulting country will return to ﬁnancial markets in about 10 quarters after defaulting
on its foreign debt.
The fraction of output lost in times of default γ is set equal to 0.02, which is the
percent in output contraction estimated by Puhan and Sturzenegger (2003) following
the default episodes in the 1980’s in Latin America.
The endowment yt for the small open economy is composed of a stochastic trend
Υt :yt = Υt
a n dt h et r e n df o l l o w s
Υt = gtΥt−1,
lngt =( 1 − ρg)lnηg + ρg lngt−1 +  
g
t




We denote the growth rate of trend income as gt with long run mean ηg. The log
growth rate follows an AR(1) process with AR coeﬃcient ρg ∈ (−1,1). Note that a posi-
tive shock  
g
t implies a permanently higher level of output, and to the extent that ρg > 0,
a positive shock today implies that the growth of output will continue to be higher be-
yond the current period. This ﬁrst order autoregressive process is approximated by a
discrete ﬁrst order Markov chain with 25 values using Hussey and Tauchen’s (1991)
procedure.
This endowment process is motivated by the work of Aguiar and Gopinath (2004a).
They ﬁnd that shocks to trend growth are the primary source of ﬂuctuations in emerging
markets rather than transitory ﬂuctuations around a stable trend. Aguiar and Gopinath
(2004b) use an endowment process with trend shocks to study sovereign default and
they show that the ability of the model to match the data is improved when trend
shocks are included. Yue (2004) shows that the argentinian output is characterized by
a stochastic trend and uses an endowment process with shocks to the trend growth rate
to study sovereign default and debt renegotiation in emerging markets economies. Since
emerging economies are subject to substantial volatility in the trend growth rate relativeto developed markets, a volatile stochastic trend is considered for the endowment process
and the values of the parameters are taken from Yue (2004). She calibrates the process
to the argentinian output using quarterly data for the period of 1980 Q1 to 2003 Q4
from MECON.
Since a realization of the growth shock g permanently aﬀects Υ, output is nonsta-
tionary with shocks to the trend growth rate. Therefore, as in Aguiar and Gopinath
(2004a) and Yue (2004) the model is detrended by the lagged endowment level yt−1 and




We normalize by yt−1, which ensures that if xt is the agent’s information set at
period t,s oi sb xt.
The parameters for the benchmark model are shown in Table 2.
5. Results
This section analyzes the simulation results and the statistical properties of the model
economy. The business cycle moments for the benchmark economy are presented in
Table 2. Business cycles statistics are average values over 100 simulations of 100 re-
alizations each, drawn from a stationary distribution. The simulated series are logged
and ﬁltered as the data. The model can match several features of emerging market
economies.
Spreads are countercyclical: the negative correlation of output with spreads is con-
sistent with the data for emerging economies, though the magnitude is lower. Output
and spreads are negatively correlated due to the asset structure of the model: there isonly one asset available to the ruling party, a one period non-contingent bond, so asset
markets are incomplete. Given this market structure, default is tempting in times when
output and consumption are low since a given debt-service payment reduces utility more
strongly in those states. Since repayment of non-contingent loans are more painful in
bad states of nature, incentives to default tend to be stronger in times of low output.
Risk neutral creditors are willing to supply loans that in bad states of the world will
result in default by charging a higher risk premium. In this way, the model can generate
counter-cyclical interest rate spreads. Aggregate consumption is used when calculating
the output-consumption correlation. In any period the consumption of one of the two
agents is zero, thus if party i is in oﬃce then aggregate consumption is simply the con-
sumption of agent i. Table 3 shows that aggregate consumption is almost as volatile as
output, and highly correlated with it.
The model can account for the negative correlation between the current account and
output as observed in the data. The fact that both the current account and spreads
are countercyclical implies that political p a r t i e sb o r r o wm o r ei ng o o dt i m e sa tal o w e r
interest rate. Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) also get this result when they consider
trend shocks. As they explain in detail, with shocks to the growth trend a good shock
is expected to persist, thus the incumbent has incentives to borrow more. Although
bond prices are decreasing in the level of foreign debt, a persistent good shock lowers
the expected probability of default which implies a favorable shift in the interest rate
schedule. If the later eﬀect dominates then it is possible to get a countercyclical current
account and spreads.
Figure 3 plots the discount bond price schedule as a function of assets for the highest
and lowest values of the shock. As the ﬁgure shows, bond prices fall in three ranges. Forsmall levels of foreign debt, the ruling party always pays back the country’s foreign debt,
so it borrows from credit markets at the international risk free interest rate. Therefore,
bond price is simply the inverse of the gross risk free rate. For values of foreign debt up
to 15.70 % of output, the government does not have any incentive to default so it still
faces risk free interest rates. However, as foreign debt goes up, at a certain debt level
bond prices start to fall. For intermediate foreign asset levels, prices are between zero
and the inverse of the risk free rate, and the price is increasing in the level of assets.
The higher the levels of foreign debt the lower the bond prices because the incentives to
default increase in foreign assets. At debt levels above 22.53% of output the incumbent
always defaults regardless of the value of the shock. At that point bond prices are zero
since the ruling party will default for sure, thus the model predicts that large indebted
countries have more incentives to default.
Figure 4 shows the default region for the calibrated economy, i.e., the combinations
of foreign debt levels and shock values for which default is optimal. Given the level of
assets, if default is optimal for a certain value of the shock, it will be optimal for all
lower values. This implies that incentives to default are stronger when the economy
receives a low growth shock. Therefore, quantitatively the model predicts that default
is more likely in bad times.
In order to assess the inﬂuence of political uncertainty on default incentives and
country spreads, diﬀerent values of π were considered. Table 4 illustrates the impact
of diﬀerent levels of political uncertainty on the behavior of interest rate spreads in the
model economy.
As the country faces a higher degree of political risk, the volatility and the maximum
spread levels increase signiﬁcantly. The default rate is also higher. The percentageincrements in these variables appear not to be linear in the change of the of re-election
probability.
Political parties are not permanently in oﬃce, the political process implies that the
current incumbent maybe will be out of oﬃce next period. The fact that political parties
alternate randomly in power inﬂuences politicians’ behavior. It is assumed that only the
incumbent has access to international credit markets. When the party in power borrows
from abroad, it promises that next period ruling party will honor the country’s foreign
debt. If the incumbent, who is borrowing from foreign lenders today, is out of power
next period, it will not have to pay back the amount borrowed today from abroad: it
will be the other party that will have to deal with foreign creditors next period. Hence,
political uncertainty implies that politicians maybe will not be asked to pay the loans
that they are requesting, so political parties are willing to borrow more at higher interest
rates. In this way, the presence of political uncertainty induces a short-sight behavior
in politicians. Since bond prices are decreasing in the level of foreign debt, additional
borrowing implies higher interest rates which are associated with larger default risk. It
follows that the lower the probability of remaining in oﬃce the higher the spreads and
more default episodes are observed in equilibrium.
In the economy without political uncertainty, π =1 , the same party is continuously
in power and default is a very rare event as it occurs on average only 8 times in 10,000
periods (quarters), implying that the country defaults every 312 years. As the party in
oﬃce borrows, the bond price starts to decrease. If the incumbent wants to borrow any
extra amount, it has to pay a higher interest rate, i.e., the marginal cost of borrowing
increases. The ruling party takes into account the eﬀect of additional borrowing on
the interest rate the country has to pay and therefore does not borrow as much as inthe case with political risk. The increase in the interest rate means that bonds are not
good instruments for insurance and consumption smoothing purposes. So in the model
without political uncertainty the party borrows from capital markets paying either low
risk premia or not premia at all. Since low levels of risk premia are related to very low
default probabilities, default is not a frequent event. This feature also explains the low
volatility of spreads obtained in the model. The standard deviations of spreads obtained
in the model is 0.0761 for the case without political uncertainty. This value is lower
than the one usually observed in data for emerging markets economies. The fact that
default episodes are rare events implies a low volatility of country spreads.
Once we include political uncertainty in the model, political parties are willing to
borrow at higher interest rates. As in the case without political risk if the ruling party
borrows more from abroad then the bond price falls, which implies higher country
spreads. Though the cost of foreign loans increases, politicians are willing to go on
borrowing since there is a positive probability that they would not have to pay back.
A lower bond price implies a higher probability of sovereign default, thus more default
cases are observed when political uncertainty is included. When we set the value of
π to 0.6, the default cases in 10,000 periods increase from 8 to 80, implying that the
country defaults almost every 30 years. Since default is a less rare event with political
uncertainty, higher country spreads are observed and their volatility is also larger.
6. Conclusions
This paper analyses the impact of political uncertainty on country interest rate spreads
and default incentives in emerging markets by developing a stochastic equilibrium model
of a small open economy with two political parties that stochastically alternate in oﬃceand where default is an equilibrium outcome. The focus is on a symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium. The disagreement between the political parties and the Markov
equilibrium approach used in the paper make any equilibrium solution based on coor-
dination between the parties be suboptimal.
The model mimics the behavior of several macroeconomic variables such as the
countercyclicality of default risk, of interest rate spreads and of the current account.
Including political uncertainty in the model allows to improve results from previous
studies, with a more reasonable discount rate.
The results of the model are derived as an equilibrium outcome of the interaction
between risk-neutral competitive creditors and the two political parties in the small
open economy. The parties are risk averse borrowers, they cannot commit to repay
the foreign debt when in oﬃce and each cares for a diﬀerent type of agent. Default
probabilities are endogenous to the economy’s incentives to default and they aﬀect the
equilibrium interest rates As observed in international credit markets, governments have
access to non contingent foreign debt, and risk neutral competitive lenders are willing
to provide debt contracts that in some states will result in default by charging a higher
premium on these contracts. Market incompleteness generates counter-cyclical default
risk because it is more costly to repay non-contingent loans in times when output and
consumption are low, than in booms.
The presence of political uncertainty induces higher levels and volatility of spreads,
higher default rates that closely match that observed in data. As the country faces a
higher degree of political uncertainty, the default rate increases. Political risk implies
that parties are not permanently in power. The incumbent, who is borrowing from
foreign lenders today, may be out of oﬃce the following period. Therefore, politicaluncertainty implies that politicians may not be asked to pay the loans that they are
requesting, so the political parties are willing to borrow at higher interest rates, which
are associated with higher spreads and more default episodes.
Interesting extensions for further research include an endogenous political process




The following algorithm solves for a symmetric equilibrium, where both parties make
the same decisions. Thus only the problem for one party is considered, since the problem
for the other party would be the same. The problem of party 1 is solved assuming that
the other party is following the same policies. Hence, convergence of policies is required.
The following algorithm is used:
1. Assume an initial function for the price of the bond q0(B0,y). To calculate the
initial value of the bond, use the inverse of the risk free rate.
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6. Iterate following steps 2 to 6 and solve for value functions and policies.
7. Given the initial price of the bond q0, and the default function D(B,y),u p d a t e










where i represents the number of iterations on the bond price and   is a small
number.7.2. Figures and Tables
Table 1. Argentinian Business Cycle Statistics (1980.1 - 2003.4)
Std Dev Correlation with GDP Correlation with Spread
GDP 4.45 -0.61
Consumption 5.12 0.96 -0.64
Current Account 1.59 -0.85 0.69
Spread 5.55 -0.61
Default Rate 0.0069
Table 2. Parameter Values
Discount Factor β 0.95
Re-election Probability π 0.7
Risk Aversion σ 0.5
Re-entry Probability µ 0.1
Endowment shock ηg 1.004
σg 0.025
ρg 0.406
U.S. Real Interest Rate rf 0.01
Output loss in Autarky γ 0.02Table 3. Simulation Results
Std Dev Correlation with GDP Correlation with Spread
GDP 4.64 -0.05
Consumption 4.83 0.97 -0.04
Current Account 1.22 -0.15 0.12
Spread 0.67 -0.05
Default Rate 0.0060
Risk Free debt Limit 15.70
Maximum Spread 2.36
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis
π =1 π =0 .9 π =0 .8 π =0 .7 π =0 .6
StDev Spread 0.0770 0.2846 0.4299 0.6728 1.0086
Max Spread 0.2479 0.9700 1.3579 2.3661 2.7841
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Figure 3. Bond Price
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Figure 4. Default Region
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